Abstract Due to the popularity of mobile devices (e.g., cell phones, PDAs, etc.), location-based services have become more and more prevalent in recent years. However, users have to reveal their location information to access location-based services with existing service infrastructures. It is possible that adversaries could collect the location information, which in turn invades user's privacy. There are existing solutions for query processing on spatial networks and mobile user privacy protection in Euclidean space. However there is no solution for solving queries on spatial networks with privacy protection. Therefore, we aim to provide network distance spatial query solutions which can preserve user privacy by utilizing K -anonymity mechanisms. In this paper, we propose an effective location cloaking mechanism based on spatial networks and two novel query algorithms, PSNN and PSRQ, for answering nearest neighbor queries and range queries on spatial networks without revealing private information of the query initiator. We demonstrate the appeal of our technique using extensive simulation results.
become increasingly popular. In addition, positioning techniques are embedded into more and more mobile devices. Based on these advances, new mobile applications allow users to issue location-dependent queries in a ubiquitous manner. Examples of such locationdependent searches include 'find the nearest gas station' and 'find the top three closest French restaurants'. To get location-dependent data, users have to reveal their current locations when launching location-dependent queries. From the server query logs of locationbased service providers (LBSP), it is possible that adversaries could collect the location history and monitor the behavior of some users, which in turn invades their privacy [20] . Therefore, with the popularity of location-based services (LBS), mobile user privacy protection becomes a very important research issue for future generation communication and networking.
Recent research has explored the K -anonymity concept [18] 1 in which one trusted server is needed to cloak at least K users' locations for protecting location privacy. In order to implement K -anonymity, one trusted server is set up to collect user location information and perform cloaking procedures in which the exact location of the query requester is blurred as a cloaked spatial area whose boundary is defined by the locations of K − 1 other users. Then, the trusted server will send the location-dependent query along with the cloaked spatial area to location-based service providers to retrieve the relevant data. Note that since the query location is an area instead of a single query point, location-dependent service providers should fetch those query results based on the cloaked spatial region. Prior work in [14] proposed a framework for location-based services without compromising location privacy. However, only a free space environment is considered, which is not fully applicable in real world environments. On the other hand, recent research has produced novel mechanisms to compute location-dependent queries on spatial networks. For example, executing nearest neighbor queries based on the spatial network distance provides a more realistic measure for applications where mobile user movements are constrained by underlying networks. Though devising spatial query schemes in spatial networks, the prior works in [11, 15] did not consider location privacy issues. Thus, we aim to provide spatial query (nearest neighbor query and range query) solutions that address privacy protection concerns in this study. With our techniques, location-based service users can enjoy high quality results without sacrificing their privacy. The contributions of our study are as follows.
-We design an improved cloaking mechanism for spatial network search space. -We propose a novel algorithm for solving privacy protected nearest neighbor queries on spatial networks. -We extend our nearest neighbor query solution to answer range queries with protection of privacy. -We demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of our approaches through extensive simulations.
Related Work
In this section, we introduce the background information and related research regarding spatial query processing, location-based services, and location privacy preservation.
Spatial Query Processing
We focus on two common types of spatial queries, namely k nearest neighbor queries and range queries. With R-tree [9] based spatial indices, depth-first search (DFS) [16] and best-first search (BFS) [10] have been the prevalent branch-and-bound techniques for processing nearest neighbor (NN) queries. The DFS method recursively expands the index nodes for searching nearest neighbor candidates. At each newly visited non-leaf node, DFS computes the ordering metrics for all its child nodes and applies pruning strategies to remove unnecessary branches. When a leaf node is reached, the data objects are retrieved and the nearest neighbor candidates are updated. In addition, the BFS technique utilizes a priority queue to store nodes to be explored through the search process. The nodes in the queue are sorted according to their minimum distance (MINDIST) to the query point. During search, the BFS repeatedly dequeues the top entry in the queue and enqueues its child nodes with their MINDIST into the queue. When a data entry is dequeued, it is inserted into the result set. In order to increase the NN query accuracy, recent research proposed solutions based on spatial networks. Kolahdouzan and Shahabi [11] presented a novel approach to efficiently evaluate kNN queries in spatial network databases using a first order Voronoi diagram. Papadias et al. [15] proposed two algorithms, the Incremental Euclidean Restriction (IER) algorithm and the Incremental Network Expansion (INE) algorithm to solve nearest neighbor queries on spatial networks.
Location Privacy Preservation
With the popularity of LBS, privacy protection for mobile users has become an important issue [8, 17] . Gruteser and Grunwald [7] proposed a middleware architecture and algorithms for maintaining location K -anonymity. Their algorithms adjust the resolution of location information along spatial or temporal dimensions to fulfill the required anonymity constraints. Based on the work in [7] , a unified privacy personalization framework is proposed in [6] to support different levels of anonymity according to the requests of users. However, these previous research approaches mainly focused on the system architecture and the location anonymizer design rather than query processing. Mokbel proposed to employ a trusted third party, the location anonymizer, which expands the user location into a spatial region for protecting user privacy [13] . Mokbel et al. also proposed related privacy-aware query processing algorithms [14] . However their query processing solutions are based on Euclidean metrics. In real life, mobile users cannot move freely in space but are usually constrained by underlying networks (e.g., cars on roads, trains on tracks, etc.). Therefore, we need solutions for processing privacy protected queries on spatial networks [12] .
System Architecture
We first describe the system architecture for supporting privacy protected spatial queries with underlying spatial networks. Figure 1 Fig. 1 The system architecture users are mobile and travel on the underlying network and they also hold privacy policies which specify the privacy requirements of each user. In this research we focus on three parameters, K -anonymity degree, the minimum cloaked region size-R min , and the minimum covered network segments-S min , that are included in the user privacy policies. A user can demand the cloaked area to cover the locations of K − 1 closest peers for anonymizing its exact location. In order to keep a reasonable size of the cloaked area in highly user-dense regions, the user decides the minimum acceptable size of R min . Since mobile users are moving on underlying spatial networks, the cloaked region has to cover a minimum number of road segments, S min , to avoid location tracking by adversaries. Based on the privacy requirements at different locations or time slots, a user can update his/her privacy policies at any time.
The Location Cloaker
Compared with location-based service providers, the location cloaker is an intermediate agent which can be trusted by mobile users. The location cloaker receives continuous location updates from mobile users and blurs their exact locations into cloaked areas A c according to individual user privacy policies before forwarding the information to location-based service providers (e.g., for buddy searching services). In addition, the location cloaker also anonymizes the location of any query requesting user q to a cloaked region before forwarding the query to related location-based service providers. Note that any user identity related information in the query is also removed by the location cloaker during the cloaking process. According to previous research [6] [7] [8] 14] there are several different mechanisms to support location anonymization. Compared with existing solutions, the location anonymizing technique proposed by Mokbel et al. [14] has prominent efficiency (low cloaking time) and flexibility (user defined privacy profile) for the cloaking process in free space environments. However, the proposed location anonymizer does not consider the characteristics of spatial network environments. Figure 2 demonstrates an example. The cloaking region in Fig. 2a is generated without considering the underlying spatial networks and there is only one road segment (i.e., the W 35th Street) contained in A c . Advisories with access to the map of this city can easily infer that the mobile user is currently driving on the W 35th Street. Consequently, the effect of the location anonymizing mechanism proposed in [14] may be drastically weakened in spatial network environments.
In our system, we adopt the grid-based pyramid data structures proposed in [1, 19] for managing the locations of mobile users. The pyramid structure is dynamically maintained for monitoring the current number of mobile users within each unit space of the whole spatial area [14] . Consequently, the size of the cloaked region can be efficiently computed. In order to avoid the aforementioned drawbacks, users have to define a minimum number of road segments which should be covered in the cloak region. The revised cloak region after taking S min into account is demonstrated in Fig. 2b (S min = 3) . With a minimum number of road segments within A c , mobile user privacy can be positively secured.
Location-Based Service Providers
Location-based service providers play the role of spatial data maintainers and spatial query processors in our system. In order to handle privacy protected spatial queries, location-based service providers implement privacy protected query processors in their databases. The privacy protected query processor has the ability to process cloaked spatial queries efficiently and retrieves an inclusive result set (i.e., the minimal set which covers all the possible answers) for query requesters. After receiving the result set, mobile users can distill the exact answers from their locations in linear time. The privacy policies of a user determine the computational complexity of his/her spatial queries. Strict privacy requirements (i.e., large K , R min , and S min values) increase the complexity of processing the query.
In addition to a privacy protected data processor, a LBSP also needs to maintain spatial databases for storing (cloaked) user locations, spatial data and road networks. The stored spatial data can be categorized as public data and private data. Public data covers static objects such as restaurants, hotels, and gas stations and also the dynamic information (e.g., real-time bus locations) which are directly open to public queries. In contrast, private data mainly comprise cloaked mobile user locations from the location cloaker. Based on the two data categories, the spatial queries submitted to a LBSP can be classified into four types: (1) public queries over public data, (2) public queries over private data, (3) private queries over public data, and (4) private queries over private data. For the first query type, there were already existing solutions proposed in [11, 15] . Because the movement of mobile users is limited by the underlying road networks, we can easily extend the mechanisms proposed in [11, 15] for solving queries of the second query type (e.g., Fig. 3a ) with probability density functions [4] . To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing solution for the third query type. Similarly the fourth query type (e.g., Fig. 3b algorithms of the third query type. Therefore, we propose our novel techniques for solving private queries over public data on spatial networks in Sect. 4.
In addition, as discussed in [15] , we assume that the spatial network database supports the following primitive operations:
-inside_segments(A c ): returns a set of subsegments of a network N which intersects with the cloaked area A c . -find_objects(segment x ): returns the data objects which fall on the input network segment
calculates the network distance of two input points, p 1 and p 2 , in the underlying network by applying an algorithm (e.g., Dijkstra's algorithm [5] ) to compute the shortest path between p 1 and p 2 .
Privacy Protected Query Processing
We now illustrate our mechanisms for solving private queries over public data on road networks. We focus on two popular query types, nearest neighbor queries and range queries.
Privacy Protected Nearest Neighbor Query on Spatial Networks
Given a query point q and an object data set S, a network k nearest neighbor query retrieves the k objects of S closest to q based on the network distance. Papadias et al. [15] proposed two algorithms (incremental Euclidean restriction and incremental network expansion) to efficiently solve nearest neighbor queries with spatial network databases. However in order to protect user privacy, a location-based service provider can only receive cloaked spatial areas from users. Therefore, LBSPs need to have a competent mechanism for retrieving an inclusive query result set based on the input cloaked area and the underlying spatial network. We design a privacy protected spatial network nearest neighbor query (PSNN) algorithm by extending the incremental network expansion algorithm [15] . PSNN first locates all the intersection points between the edges of the input cloaked area A c and the spatial network as a point set T by executing primitive database operations. If T is not empty, A c covers at least one network segment. We denote these network segment(s) within A c as Seg i and the segments outside A c as Seg o . According to the network topology, the network edges inside A c can be fully connected or comprise several separate subgroups. Figure 4 illustrates the two cases. Since we designed efficient solutions for the case in which the network edges inside A c are fully connected, we can utilize the divide and conquer strategy to handle the case demonstrated in Fig. 4b . Consequently, we perform a pre-process for splitting the input cloaked area until each subregion contains only one connected network segment set. Then we execute our algorithms on each subregion separately and merge their results after the complete computation. For ease of presentation, we assume the pre-process has been executed in the following sections. We observe that the number of data objects inside a cloaked area A c can meet one of two conditions: (i) there are at least k objects inside A c or (ii) there are fewer than k objects within A c .
The Cloaked Area Contains at Least k Objects
Since Seg i contains a limited number of network segments, PSNN starts the search on Seg i for retrieving data objects inside A c . If Seg i covers more than or equal to k data objects, the search can be finished by expanding the intersection points in T. First PSNN includes the data objects within A c into the result set R. Next, for each point t i in T, PSNN calculates the distance from t i to its kth nearest object inside A c as Dist (t i , n k ), and then expands outward from point t i to search for data objects on Seg o within distance Dist (t i , n k ) (the search upper bound). Consequently, we can cover the special case when q is located exactly at t i . All the newly discovered data objects are inserted into the result set R. Figure 5 demonstrates an example where the circles represent the nodes in the modeling graph, triangles indicate data objects, and the gray rectangle stands for the cloaked area. Assuming that only one nearest neighbor is queried (k = 1), PSNN first retrieves n 1 by searching the network segments inside A c . Since the number of data objects found in A c is equal to 1, PSNN computes the network distance from t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 to n 1 as 2, 5, and 6, respectively. Afterwards, PSNN expands the search space outbound from the three intersection points according to their distance to n 1 . No data object is found from the expansion of t 1 and t 3 . The expansion of t 2 reaches n 2 and it is inserted into the result set. Consequently, the final search result set covers objects n 1 and n 2 .
The Cloaked Area Contains Fewer than k Objects
If there are fewer than k data objects found on Seg i , PSNN has to search the network segments which are outside of A c . Since the points in T are all on the boundary of A c , they expand t i outward A c for searching objects within distance Dist (t i , n k ) 8:
insert any discovered objects into R 9: end for 10: else 11: for ∀t i ∈ T do 12:
de-queue the node p in Q with smaller Dist ( p, t i ) 17:
while Dist ( p, t i ) < Dist max and the data set contains at least k objects do 18:
for each non-visited adjacent vertex p x of p do 19:
update 
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Intersection determine the network search expansion upper bound. Consequently, PSNN executes the network expansion from all the intersection points for retrieving an inclusive result set. For every point t i in T, the PSNN algorithm first retrieves the network segment p m p n which passes through t i and searches all data objects on this segment. In the mean time, the two end points p m and p n are inserted into a queue Q with their distance to t i . Afterward, if the search found fewer than k objects on p m p n or the search retrieved no fewer than k objects but one end point of p m p n whose distance to t i is shorter than Dist (t i , n k ) (n k is the kth 
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nearest neighbor of t i ), the end point p x which is closer to t i will be de-queued from Q and expanded. For each non-visited adjacent point p y of p x , PSNN searches p x p y , updates the result set, and inserts p y with its distance to t i into Q. Then the point in Q with the shortest distance to t i is de-queued. The procedure repeats until k nearest neighbors of t i are found and the k objects are inserted into the result set R. PSNN repeats this process until it has expanded all the points in T.
Privacy Protected Range Query on Spatial Networks
We define a spatial network range query as follows: given a query point q, a range value r , and an object data set S, the query retrieves all elements of S that are within network distance r from q. For executing a privacy protected spatial network range query (PSRQ), first we have to locate the intersection points of the cloaked spatial area A c and the underlying road network as a point set T = {t 1 , . . . , t m }. Then, PSRQ searches the network segments inside A c and inserts the retrieved objects into R. For each point t i in T we can compute a set of candidate segments within network range r from t i and then retrieve the data objects falling on these segments. Because the search range r could be a large number and it may cover many candidate segments, it is inefficient to check each candidate segment with the primitive operation find_objects(segment). Therefore, we utilize the intersection join function [3] for retrieving all intersection object pairs from the spatial network R-tree and the object R-tree. When reaching the leaf node level, PSRQ executes the plane-sweep method with the object R-tree nodes which intersect with the MBR of at least one candidate segment and stores the qualified objects into R.
An example is demonstrated in Fig. 6 . Assuming r is equal to a 7 unit distance, PSRQ joins the candidates segments (solid lines) with the object R-tree and retrieves leaf node E 5 intersecting with segment p 4 p 6 . After executing the intersection test (plane-sweep method), PSRQ retrieves n 4 as the query result. The complete algorithm of PSRQ is shown in Algorithm 2.
Experimental Validation
In this section, we present extensive simulation results of our location cloaker and query processing algorithms. We implemented our cloaking technique and privacy protected query algorithms in a simulator to evaluate the performance of our approach. Our main objectives are to observe the influence of performance related factors (e.g., cloaked region size) on the system and to test the feasibility of our approach. Performance is measured in terms of the Algorithm 2 PSRQ (q, r , A c ) 1: locate the intersection points between A c and the underlying network as T = {t 1 , . . . , t m } 2: Seg i = inside_segments(A c ) 3: search objects on Seg i and insert the retrieved objects into R 4: for each point t i in T do 5: Compute all the candidate segments within distance r from t i as C 6: Intersection join C with the object R-tree for finding intersection leaf nodes 7: for each retrieved leaf node E i do 8:
R ti = intersection test of the intersected segments with data objects in E i 9: end for 10: R = R ∪ R ti 11: end for 12: Sort R for removing duplicates 13: return R cloaked region size, result set size, and CPU time. All simulation results were recorded after the system model reached steady state.
Simulator Implementation
Our simulator consists of three main components, the mobile environment, the location cloaker, and the location-based service provider. For the mobile environment, we utilized the network-based moving objects generation framework [2] to generate a set of mobile users and the underlying road network inside a geographical area, measuring 10 miles by 10 miles. Each mobile user is an independent object which encapsulates all its related parameters (e.g., its current speed and destination). We implemented the location cloaker as a new module for interacting with mobile users to anonymize spatial queries in the framework. Our privacy protected query approaches (Sects. 4.1 and 4.2) were also implemented inside the framework as new functions and play the role of the LBSP. We obtained our road network data of the City of Los Angeles and Riverside County from the TIGER/Line street vector data available from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Exploring Performance Influencing Factors
We are interested in the effect of three major performance influencing factors: the cloaked region size, the number of k, and the Point of Interest (POI) number, of spatial queries. We experimented with both nearest neighbor queries and range queries with these factors as follows.
Effect of the Cloaked Region Size. We increased the cloaked region size from 2% to 10% of the whole experimental region and the cloaked region size also reflects the influences of the two privacy policy settings-K and R min . Figure 7 demonstrates the result set size and query processing time with different cloaked region sizes. Since a bigger cloaked region usually intersects with more underlying network segments, it generates a larger candidate result set and takes longer to process. As shown in Fig. 7a , the curve of PSRQ remarkably increases because the result set covers all the POIs within the cloaked region and the search range r . In contrast, PSNN removes duplicated objects from R. In addition, the query processing time of PSNN increases notably with an enlarged cloaked region size as illustrated in Fig. 7b .
Effect of k. We tested the impact of varying the number of requested nearest neighbors, i.e., k. We altered k in the range from 4 to 20. As shown in Fig. 8 , the result set size grows when we raised k from 4 to 20 and we also observe that the result set increases super-linearly when k is a relatively large number. For example, the result set covers around 25% more objects than the queried k number when k is equal to 20. This factor has a similar super-linear influence on the query processing time as demonstrated in Fig. 8b .
Effect of the Number of POI.
To see the effect of varying the total POI number, we increased the total POI number from 200 to 1,000 in the simulation environment. Figure 9 illustrates the result set size and query processing time of PSNN and PSRQ with increasing POI numbers. We note that with a higher POI density the result set of PSRQ increases conspicuously compared with PSNN. This is expected, since PSRQ has to report all the objects inside the cloaked region. In addition, the query processing time of PSNN is always longer than that of PSRQ.
Conclusions
In this paper we present an advanced location cloaker and two novel algorithms for processing k nearest neighbor queries and range queries on spatial networks with privacy protection. The main idea is to hide the exact mobile user location with a cloaked region. The cloaked region covers the query requester and at least K − 1 other users based on the K -anonymity concept. The spatial queries are executed based on both the cloaked region and the underlying networks. A candidate result set will be returned to the requesting user who filters out the exact answer. Our comprehensive simulations demonstrate the efficiency of our methods. We plan to extend the proposed solutions to support spatial network based query processing with other privacy protection models (e.g., dummy-based solutions and transformation-based solutions).
